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COMMENT
Land Use Regulations and the Takings Clause:
Are Courts Applying a Tougher Standard
to Regulators after Nollan?
INTRODUCTION
In 1987, the United States Supreme Court decided Nollan v. California Coastal Commission.1 Many commentators have interpreted that
decision as heightening the standard of review for government land use2
regulations challenged under the takings clause of the fifth amendment.
This interpretation was reasonable, given the Court's unprecedented scrutiny of the connection between California's purpose for regulating in Nollan and the means the state chose for accomplishing its purpose. In fact,
the Court devoted much of its opinion to determining whether the Cali3
fornia Coastal Commission was really doing what it said it was doing.
In Nollan, the California Coastal Commission ('the Commission')
granted the Nollans a building permit to replace their small seaside bungalow with a large single-family residence, on the condition that the Nollans grant an easement for the public to walk along the beach in front of
their house. 4 The easement would be along the sand between the mean
high tide line and a seawall which separated the Nollans' yard from the
beach. 5 The Nollans sued the Commission claiming that the easement
constituted a taking of their property without just compensarequirement
6
tion.
The Supreme Court found that the Commission's purpose for
imposing the easement was "protecting the public's ability to see the
beach, assisting the public in overcoming the 'psychological barrier' to
using the beach created by a developed shorefront, and preventing congestion on the public beaches." 7 The Court decided that the easement
1. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
2. See, e.g., D. Reinmiller, Comment, Fifth Amendment Takings: A More ConservativeStand on
Land Use Policies, 21 Creighton L.Rev. 213-37 (Fall 1987); A. Peterson, The Takings Clause: In
Search of Underlying Principles,77 Calif. L. Rev. 1299-63 (1989).
3. See, e.g., Nollan, 483 U.S. at 850 n. 4 (Brennan, J., dissenting)(criticizing the Court for
attempting to substitute its judgment over the Commission as to the best way to preserve
overall public beach access).
4. Id. at 828.
5. Id.
6. Id.
at 829.
7. Id. at 835.
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requirement was not sufficiently related to the Commission's stated purpose. As viewed by the Court, the impediment created by the Nollans'
new house was visual access 'to' the beach, while the easement granted
access 'along' the beach. 8 Therefore, the Court invalidated the
easement
9
requirement as constituting a taking of the Nollans' property.
The Court appeared to heighten its traditional standard for determining whether a legitimate connection exists between the government's
purpose and the regulation it enacts to promote that purpose. In previous
cases, the Court generally had upheld a regulation if it was "reasonably
necessary" to advance a legitimate governmental purpose. 10 In Nollan, the
Court required an "essential nexus" between the governmental purpose
and the regulatory action.1 Finding such a connection entirely absent in
Nollan, the Court invalidated the land use restriction as an "out-and-out
12
plan of extortion."
This Comment briefly examines the ways in which courts
reviewed regulatory takings before Nollan, and the Nollan analysis itself.
Primarily, it explores whether the Nollan decision actually has made it
more difficult for land use regulations to survive constitutional challenges
under the takings clause, and concludes that, generally, it has not. The
Comment reaches this conclusion by reviewing post-Nollan regulatory
takings cases to see how the courts have dealt with Nollan's apparently
heightened scrutiny of government actions.
REGULATORY TAKINGS PRE-NOLLAN
The state of the law regarding regulatory takings before the Nollan
decision was none too clear. Between 1977 and 1982, the Court announced
and applied at least four different tests for determining whether a land use
regulation affected an unconstitutional taking of private property.13 These
are the three-part test in Penn Central Transportation Company v. New York
City,14 a two-part test in Agins v. City of Tiburon,15 the "no economically
viable use" test,16 and a per se rule regarding permanent physical occupa17
tion.
8. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 838.
9. Id. at 841-42.
10. See Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980); Penn Central Transportation Co.
v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
11. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837.
12. Id. (quoting J.E.D. Associates v. Atkinson, 432 A.2d 12, 14-15 (1981)).
13. Peterson, supra note 2, at 1316.
14. 438 U.S. 104.
15. 447 U.S. 225.
16. Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Association, 452 U.S. 264 (1981).
17. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 435 n.12. For indepth
analysis of these four tests and how the Court applied them in a variety of circumstances, see
Peterson, supra note 2.
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The Penn Centraltest examined 1) whether the land use restriction
is 'reasonably necessary' to effectuate a substantial government purpose,
2) the extent of interference with the claimant's 'distinct, investmentbacked expectations,' and 3) whether the law permits the claimant any
'economically viable' use of the property.18 In Agins, the Court's test
became 1) whether the regulation 'substantially advance[s] legitimate
state interests,' and 2) does not deny an owner economically viable use of
the land.1 9
Penn Central and Agins both challenged regulations as applied to a
particular property. The Court developed quite different standards for
facial challenges to land use laws.
In Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Association, the
Court addressed whether the 'mere enactment' of the Surface Mining Act
constituted a taking.20 It concluded that the only inquiry in such cases was
whether the Act denied owners 'economically viable use' of the land.21
The Court announced a fourth test in Loretto v. Teleprompter ManhattanCATV Corp.2 2 There, the Court held that a permanent physical occupation of any portion of a property will constitute a taking. 23 Loretto
appeared to create a per se taking rule, since neither the importance of the
government interest, nor the degree of economic impact on the property
had any bearing on the analysis. 24
The Court described its general view of takings analysis in Kaiser
Aetna v. United States.25 There, the Court noted that its examination of takings claims revealed several factors of particular significance-"such as
the economic impact of the regulation, its interference with reasonable
investment backed expectations, and the character of the governmental
action.... ."26 However, the Court conceded the absence of any 'set for27
mula' for determining when government action constituted a taking.
Rather, it acknowledged that its takings cases have been "essentially ad
"28
hoc, factual inquiries ....

18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 127.
Agins, 447 U.S. at 260.
Hodel, 452 U.S. at 295 (citing Agins, 447 U.S. 255 at 260).
Id. at 296
Loretto, 458 U.S. 419.
Id. at 432-33 n. 9.
Id.

25. 444 U.S. 164,175 (1979).
26. Id.
27. Id. (quoting Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124).
28. Id.
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APPLICATION OF TAKINGS ANALYSIS
TO THE NOLLAN CASE
The Court applied both the Loretto and the Agins tests to the fact
29
situation in Nollan. Justice Scalia, writing for the five-member majority,
invoked Loretto, noting that the right to exclude all others is one of the
"'most essential sticks in the bundle of rights that are commonly characterized as property."' 30 The Court found that requiring the Nollans to
grant an easement across their beachfront resulted in a permanent physical occupation of their property.3 1 The Loretto rule was satisfied because
individuals would be permitted to 'pass to and fro,' and continuously
traverse the property,32even though no person had the right to permanently
occupy the premises.
The Court might have ended its analysis at this point, finding a
per se violation of the takings clause. But in fact, it found that even a permanent physical occupation of property would not constitute a taking if it
were a legitimate condition of a building permit. 33 No taking occurs if the
condition imposed by the permit promotes the same legitimate governmental interest that supports the government's power to outright refuse
34
the permit.
Therefore, the Court examined whether the easement requirement sufficiently promoted the Commission's purpose, as described by
the Court, of preserving the public's ability to see the beach. 35 The Court
applied the Agins test, asking whether the regulation substantially
advanced a legitimate government interest, and
whether it denied the
36
owner economically viable use of the property.
The Court assumed without deciding that the Commission's
interest in protecting the public's visual access to the beach was a legitimate governmental interest.37 It proceeded to determine whether the permit requirement substantially advanced the Commission's goal.
The Court noted that previous cases had not established exact
standards for determining what type of connection between the regulation and the state interest would satisfy the requirement that "the former
'substantially advance' the latter."38 However, the majority clearly stated
29. Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices White, Powell and O'Connor joined in the opinion. Dissenting, were Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun and Stevens.
30. Nollan, 483 U.S. 825 at 831 (quoting Loretto, at 458 U.S. 433).
31. Id. at 832.

32, Id.
33. Id.at 836-37.
34. Id. at 836.
35. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 835.
36. Id.at 834.
37. Id.at 835.
38. Id.at 834.
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that the standard was 'quite different' from either due process or equal
protection standards of review.39 It rejected outright rational basis review
as set forth in Justice Brennan's dissenting opinion, finding it insufficient
that "the State could 'rationally have
decided' that the measure adopted
40
might achieve the State's objective."
As a result, the Court engaged in a detailed discussion of the connection between the easement requirement and the Commission's purpose for regulating the Nollans' use of their beachfront property. 41 The
Court noted in passing that the Commission was concerned about the
increased private use of the shorefront by property owners, and the cumulative burden on the public's ability to pass to and along the beach. 42 Nevertheless, the Court focused primarily on the Commission's stated interest
in protecting the public's ability to see the beach.43
The Court found that the Commission could have attached
some condition to the Nollans' building permit which would protect the
public's ability to view the beach.4 4 The Court suggested that a height
limitation, a width restriction or a ban on fences would have been constitutional. 45 Even a provision requiring a viewing spot on the Nollans'
property, a physical occupation, would not be a taking, since it would
46
directly further the Commission's stated objective.
However, the Court found that the easement condition "utterly
fails to further the end advanced as the justification for the [regulation]."
The lack of this 'essential nexus' converts the government's action into a
means of getting the easement without paying for it.48 The permit condition must further the same governmental purpose that supports the Commission's power to deny the permit entirely. Otherwise, the condition is
"not a valid land use regulation, but 'an out-and-out plan of extortion."'49
The Court decided that granting access for people on the beach to
walk across the Nollans' beachfront failed to address the problem of viewing the beach. 50 The Court followed a very limited interpretation of the
Commission's purpose for requiring the easement, "visual access," and
39. Id. at 834 n. 3.
40. Id. (quoting Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456,466 (1981)).
41. A small bungalow, which the Nollan's rented out to others, already existed on the
property. An eight foot seawall separated the beach portion of the property from the rest of
the lot. The historic mean high tide line is the property's ocean-side boundary marker. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 827.
42. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 829.
43. Id. at 835.
44. Id. at 836.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837.
48. Id.
49. Id. (quoting J.E.D. Associates v. Atkinson, 432 A.2d 12, 14-15 (1981).
50. Id.
at 838.
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found that the easement did not advance that purpose at all. 51 According
to the Court, the nexus between the easement and the problem created by
the Nollans' new house would not meet "even the most untailored stan52
dards."
This extremely narrow view of the Commission's interests conflicts with the Court's own description of the concerns raised by the Nollans' building project. The Court noted the Commission's findings that the
Nollans' new house would increase private usage of the shorefront. 53 In
addition, the larger house would burden the public's ability to traverse to
and along the beach. 54 The Court did not reject or even question these findings. However, the Court chose not to examine whether the connection
between these problems and the easement requirement would satisfy its
new "essential nexus" standard. This is especially curious in light of the
fact that the easement along the beach seems directly to address the con55
cerns raised by these findings.
In a more deferential mood, the Court might also have looked to
the language of the California Coastal Act which guided the Commission.
The Act provides that "public access from the nearest public roadway to
the shoreline and along the coast shall be provided in new development
projects."5 6 Pre-Nollan, the Court might have determined that among the
Commission's legitimate concerns was to protect access along the coast,
which the easement requirement would have directly achieved.
Not only did the Court inexplicably limit its view of the Commission's purpose, it also abandoned its traditional assumption that legislatures act rationally. In contrast to previous regulatory takings cases, the
Nollan Court did not look for ways that the government's action might
reasonably advance its statutory purpose. Rather, the Court demonstrated a deep distrust of legislatures by suggesting that governments
might enact stringent land use regulations which they could waive in
return for unrelated concessions from developers. 5 7 Further, the Court
made the legislative determination that such schemes would be less effective in accomplishing the goals of land use regulation than would more
58
lenient, 'nontradeable' regulation.
51. Id,
52. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 838.
53. Id, at 829.

54. Id.
55. The Court's disregard of these Commission findings which provide a common sense
connection with the Commission's easement requirement contrasts sharply with the Court's
later willingness in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S.Ct. 2886 (1992), to rely on
the contested and counter-intuitive trial court finding that beachfront lots were rendered
totally valueless when the state prohibited building on them. See discussion of Lucas infra text
at 960.
56. Cal. Pub. Res. Code §30212(a) (West 1986).
57. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837 n. 5.

58. Id.
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Nollan might have been decided differently if the Court had taken
a less cramped view of the burden the Nollans' building project imposed
on the public's access of the beach, and of the Commission's purpose for
the easement. The Court's decision makes it clear that the Court disapproved of requiring the Nollans to give up control of the sand in front of
their seawall. But it is hard to accept the Court's reasoning that there was
no connection between California's goal of enhancing public access to the
shoreline and the creation of a public walkway along the beach. Nonetheless, many commentators and courts have seen the case as requiring a
heightened level of judicial scrutiny of the means governments choose for
achieving their land use goals.

CONCERNS ABOUT THE NOLLAN DECISION
The four dissenting justices in the Nollan decision voiced many
concerns about the Court's apparently heightened scrutiny of government
land use regulation. Justice Brennan decried the Court's usurpation of legislative authority.59 He chastised the Court for attempting to substitute its
judgment about the best way to preserve public access to the California
60
coastline.
Brennan warned that the precision required of the Commission
penalized the Commission for its flexibility.6 1 He predicted that the decision would hamper the Commission's innovative efforts to preserve a
fragile national resource. 6 2 All the dissenting Justices noted that rapid
development poses serious land use problems. They agreed that govern63
ment requires flexibility to develop creative solutions to those problems.
Some commentators assumed that the Court's lack of deference to
the Commission in Nollan signaled a stricter scrutiny of land use regulations.64 Some have suggested that the Nollan decision will stimulate takings challenges against
government regulations, and greater success in
65
those challenges.

59. 483 U.S. at 846 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting)(quoting Gorieb v. Fox, 274 U.S. 603, 608 (1927)
("'Legislatures... are better qualified than courts to determine the necessity... of regulation
[interfering with property rights], and their conclusions should not be disturbed by the
courts unless clearly arbitrary and unreasonable.'")
60. Id. at 845-46, 850 n. 4 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
61. Id. at 848 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
62. Id.
63. Id. at 864 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Id. at 865 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); Id. at 867
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
64. See, e.g., Reinmiller, supra note 2.
65. See, e.g., id. at 233.
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THE STATUS OF REGULATORY
TAKINGS AFTER NOLLAN
Several of the circuit courts of appeal and federal district courts
have reviewed regulatory takings claims since the Supreme Court
announced its decision in Nollan. Although many of the courts refer to the
'heightened scrutiny,"'66 or 'strict scrutiny,' 67 required by Nollan, very few
seem to have applied any truly tougher standard of review than pre-NolIan courts. In addition, few have actually found that a land use regulation
effected a taking.
In fact, Nollan's confusing application of prior takings tests, and
failure to clearly enunciate its 'essential nexus' requirement, have
prompted courts to invoke Nollan for a variety of conflicting propositions.
Some courts find that Nollan's 'essential nexus' analysis leads to a taking
only if there is no relationship between the government's stated goal and
the means it chooses to achieve its goal.68 Many courts have simply distinguished Nollan on its facts. 69 Still other courts have found that70the holding
is limited to exaction fees, or to physical encroachment cases.
FLOOD CONTROLS AND PROTECTION
OF NATURAL RESOURCES
The Supreme Court's most recent regulatory takings decision,
Lucas v. South CarolinaCoastal Council,71 unfortunately sheds no new light
on the Court's standard of review for land use regulations. In that case an
owner of shorefront property, Lucas, claimed that South Carolina's Beachfront Management Act which prohibited certain coastal development
worked a taking of his property. The Act was part of South Carolina's
comprehensive, long-range plan for gradually eliminating development
along its fragile dunes. The Act contained findings that the dune system
was critically eroding, and that unwise development contributed to the
sysdestruction of the dunes. 72 Furthermore, the Act noted that the dune
73
tem provides a coastal storm barrier, protecting lives and property.
In accordance with these findings, the Act provided for setback
requirements for development along the shoreline. Although Lucas' property was zoned for residential development, the Act's setback require66. See Associated Builders & Contractors v. Baca, 769 F. Supp. 1537,1552 (N.D. Cal. 1991).
67. See McNulty v. Town of Indialantic, 727 F.Supp. 604 (M.D. Fla. 1989).
68. See Commercial Builders of Northern California v. City of Sacramento, 941 F.2d 872
(9th Cir. 1991).
69. See Naegele Outdoor Advertising Inc. v. City of Durham, 844 F.2d 172 (4th Cir. 1988).
70. See Adolph v. Federal Emergency Management Agency, 854 F.2d 732 (5th Cir. 1988).
71. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S.Ct. 2886 (1992).
72. Id. at 2896 n. 10.
73. Id.
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ments precluded Lucas from building on either of his two lots. 74 However,
Lucas conceded at trial that the Beachfront Management Act was a legitimate means of furthering the state's goal of protecting its fragile coast, and
claimed only that South Carolina must compensate him.75 The Court had
no opportunity to consider whether the Act met Nollan's 'essential nexus'
requirement because Lucas did not contest the legitimacy of the connection between South Carolina's goals and its prohibition of his building
project.
Instead the Court rested its decision on the trial court's finding
that the Act had rendered Lucas' property 'valueless.' 7 6 It cited Nollan for
the proposition that a per se taking occurs when a regulation denies the
owner all economically beneficial use of land. 77 In such circumstances,
compensation must be paid unless the state could have achieved the same
land use restriction under its existing property or nuisance law. 78 Lucas
seems to create a new twist on the economically viable use rule, without
clarifying the apparently heightened standard for reviewing land use regulation which was unveiled in Nollan.
Before the Supreme Court decided Lucas, another South Carolina
landowner challenged in the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals the portion
of the state's Beachfront Management Act which prohibited rebuilding of
any existing coastal structures once they were destroyed beyond repair.79
The plaintiff in that case, Esposito, claimed that the Act constituted a taking because it greatly reduced the value of his property, by preventing him
from future rebuilding.80
The Fourth Circuit first assessed the claim by applying Nollan.
With very little analysis, it found that the means the state had adopted
were 'sufficiently well-founded' to meet the serious problem of beachfront
erosion. 81 It declared that the Act met Nollan's 'essential nexus' requirement.

82

The court went further and applied the three-part Penn Central
analysis, looking at 1) the character of the government action, 2) the extent
of the regulation's interference with the claimant's distinct investmentbacked expectations, and 3) the economic impact of the regulation on the
claimant.83 Applying both the Nollan and Penn Central tests, the court

74. Id. at 2889-90.
75. Id. at 2890.

76. Id.
77. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2893.
78. Id. at 2900.

79. Esposito v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 939 F.2d 165 (4th Cir. 1991).
80. Id. at 168.
81. Id. at 169.
82. Id.

83. Id.
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found4 that the regulations did not constitute a taking of Esposito's prop8

erty.

The dissent argued that fairness and justice required South Carolina to pay for its sudden change in land use policy.85 However, it did not
even mention Nollan as support for this proposition.
In Adolph v. FederalEmergency Management Agency,86 the Fifth Circuit examined building ordinances enacted by a Louisiana parish as flood
control measures. Property owners within the parish claimed that the
ordinances made development of property prohibitively expensive,
resulting in a taking of their property. 87The court noted the plaintiffs'
assumption that the Supreme Court had adopted a more searching scrutiny in regulatory takings cases. However, the court found no merit in the
contention that Nollan had significantly changed judicial review of tak88
ings.

Rather, the Fifth Circuit found that a regulation might affect a taking under Nollan if it did not substantially advance a legitimate government interest, or if it deprived a landowner of economically viable use of
the property.89 Nollan simply "did not revolutionize takings law." 90 Without undertaking any Nollan-type analysis of the 'essential nexus' between
the government's interest in flood control and the challenged ordinances,
the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of the property
owners' suit.
A Florida beachfront property owner, McNulty, challenged a
town ordinance which imposed a setback requirement on ocean front
property.91 The ordinance rendered McNulty's vacant lots unbuildable
without a variance from the town. The town repeatedly denied the variance, and McNulty filed an action alleging that his property had been
taken without just compensation. 92
The United States district court in Florida applied the three-part
Penn Central test for regulatory takings. Addressing the first part of that
test, the court found that Nollan had used 'strict scrutiny' to examine the
nexus between the regulation and the claimed state interest.93 The court
noted that in Nollan the necessary connection was missing. 94 Here, the
court found that the town acted pursuant to its police powers to protect
public safety and welfare by preserving the dune system.9 5 The court
84. Esposito, 939 F.2d at 170.

85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

Id. at 172.
854 F.2d 732 (5th Cir. 1988)
Id. at 734.
Id. at 737.
Id. at 737.
Id.
McNulty v. Town of Indialantic, 727 F.Supp. 604.
Id. at 605-6.
Id. at 606.
Id.
Id. at 607
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found that the nexus requirement was satisfied by testimony from experts
dune vegetation and
that McNulty's proposed project would degrade the 96
cause erosion of the dune sand on adjacent property
The court went further and applied the remaining prongs of the
Penn Centraltest to determine if the regulation went 'too far.' It examined
the economic impact on McNulty's property, the deprivation of invest97
ment-backed expectations, and the character of the government action.
The court concluded that the facts of the case failed to establish either a
lack of sufficient nexus under Nollan or a regulation that goes too far
under Penn Central.9 8 The court therefore found no taking. 99

All of these cases involve regulation of land on grounds of public
safety. The federal courts seem to find no difficulty establishing a sufficient nexus between the government's interest in protecting the public
and the land use regulations it enacts to do so. However, the Supreme
Court's opinion in Lucas adds a new element to the analysis of whether
land use regulations intended to protect the public constitute a taking. If
such regulation is a taking after Lucas, then governments may only act to
if they can afford the price of compensating
prevent such public harms
100
every affected landowner.
IMPACT FEES
The Ninth Circuit recently reviewed the constitutionality of an
impact fee imposed on commercial developers. 101 In 1989, the City of Sacramento enacted the Housing Trust Fund Ordinance ('the Ordinance'). 10 2
The Ordinance imposed a fee for the issuance of permits for nonresidential development. The Ordinance also recited findings that nonresidential
development was a 'major factor in attracting new employees to the
region' and that the influx of new employees created a need for new hous10 3
ing in the City.
The findings were based on a report by a private consulting firm
commissioned by the City. The study examined the need for low-income
housing, the effect of nonresidential development on the demand for lowincome housing, and the appropriateness of exacting fees from nonresidential development to pay for such housing. 104 The study then calcu96. McNulty, 727 F.Supp. at 607.
97. Id. at 607-12.
98. Id. at 614.
99. Id.

100. The price tag would in many cases be prohibitive. For instance in Lucas, the trial court
ordered the state to pay Lucas for his two lots $1,232,387.50 in 'just compensation.' Lucas, 112
S. Ct. at 2890.
101. Commercial Builders of Northern California v. City of Sacramento, 941 F.2d 872 (9th
Cir. 1991).
102. Id. at 873.
103. Id.
104. Id.
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lated the development fees based on the estimated public subsidy per
low-income household connected to the development.' 05
The Ordinance called for the payment of development fees
directly into a fund to assist financing of low-income housing. The City
estimated that about nine percent of the annual cost of the required housing, or about $3.6 million would be generated by the fees. 106 Commercial
Builders, a group of commercial developers, sued the City claiming that
the Ordinance constituted a taking of their property. The Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit analyzed the takings claim primarily according to the
standard announced in Nollan. As a preliminary matter, the court stated
that it was "not persuaded that Nollan materially changes the level of scrutiny we must apply to this Ordinance." 10 7 Further, it observed that no
court after Nollan has changed the level of scrutiny applied to land use
regulation unless the case involved a physical encroachment on prop10 8
erty.
The Ninth Circuit found that the exaction would be invalid under
Nollan only if there was "no evidence of a nexus between the development
and the problem the exaction seeks to address." 109 Under this interpretation of Nollan, the court found the nexus requirement satisfied.
The dissent claimed that the Ordinance expanded the police
power of the state to the point that a land use regulation became an 'outand-out plan of extortion, just as Nollan warned n 0 It found that the study
commissioned by the City of Sacramento demonstrated at best a "tenuous
and theoretical connection between commercial development and housing needs."1 11 The dissent argued that development fees are an unconstitutional taking when they fail to offset the cost of public improvements
necessitated by the development, but rather provide "private subsidies
2
with little or no causal connection to the development."n
Further, the dissent characterized the Ordinance as an attempt to
force developers to underwrite social policy. It stated, "The Takings
11 3
Clause prohibits singling out developers to bear this burden."
In this application of the Nollan principle, specific findings by the
legislature supported the nexus between the government's stated purpose
105. Id. That figure was reduced by about half, in the interest of erring on the side of conservatism.
106. Commercial Builders of Northern California, 941 F.2d at 873.

107. Id.at 874.
108. Id.
109. Id.at 875.
110. Id.at 876.
111. Commercial Builders of Northern California, 941 F.2d at 877.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 876 (Beezer, J., dissenting). This equal protection strand of Nollan has been noted
by at least one other court. Del Monte Dunes v. City of Monterey, 920 F.2d 1496,1509 (9th Cir.
1990) (Nollan assumed that the action might violate the equal protection clause if the property owner were singled out to bear the burden of remedying California's coastal access prob-

lems).
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and the regulatory action it took in furtherance of that purpose. Despite
the dissent's vehement language, these findings make it very difficult for a
court to find no connection between the need for low-income housing and
the imposition of impact fees on commercial building. Other land use regulators might consider this type of factual finding as a useful tool to support regulatory actions against constitutional challenge.
MANDATORY CONCESSIONS
In Leroy Land Development v. Tahoe Regional PlanningAgency,114 a
developer entered a settlement agreement in 1982 with the Planning
Agency. The developer agreed to provide several on-site and off-site
improvements in return for which he was granted permission to build 185
of 203 proposed condominium units near Lake Tahoe. Following the Nollan decision, the developer sought a release from his off-site duties, under
the theory that these duties violated the standards in Nollan.
The federal court for the district of Nevada found that Nollan
required a 'fairly close nexus' between the regulatory condition and the
underlying governmental purpose. 115 Under that standard, the district
court found that the off-site measures went far beyond alleviating the burden imposed on the Lake Tahoe area by the development project." 6 The
court therefore released the developer from his off-site obligations.
The Ninth Circuit reversed, finding that a settlement agreement,
consented to by the parties, could not be the basis for a government taking.117 Even assuming that the government had unilaterally imposed the
off-site mitigation measures, the Ninth Circuit still found no taking. The
Court found that under Nollan, a land use regulation is valid if it substantially advances a legitimate government interest and does not deny the
owner economically viable use of the land. 118 The court noted that in Nollan, the regulation failed to further the state's interest.
In contrast, the court in Leroy found that requiring the developer
to take off-site mitigation measures directly furthered the state's interest
in preventing erosion and pollution caused by development at Lake
Tahoe. 119 The district court had found that this developer could not be
singled out to bear the burden of the Planning Agency's efforts to solve
these problems. 120 However, the Ninth Circuit found that the develop114. 939 F.2d 696 (9th Cir. 1991).
115. Leroy Land Development Corp. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 733 F.Supp. 1399,

1401 (D. Nev. 1990).
116. Id.
117. 939 F.2d at 698.
118. Id. at 699.
119. Id.
120. Leroy, 733.F.Supp. at 1401.
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er's property was a high erosion risk and the121
off-site requirements could
ameliorate the damage caused by his project.
In 1991, a builders association in the San Francisco area challenged a building permit condition which required contractors to pay
'prevailin wages' to construction employees on private construction
projects.
The plaintiffs relied primarily on Nollan for the proposition
that a nexus must exist between the conditions required under a building
permit and legitimate police power goals. 123
The federal district court found a way to avoid Nollan scrutiny.
The court found that the regulation did not regulate use of land since it did
not restrict the right to develop or use land. 12" Rather, the enactments rendered development more costly.125 Therefore, the court rejected the takings claim, noting that it did not
have to subject the legislation to the
126
"heightened scrutiny of Nollan."
Some courts, however, have applied Nollan in its strictest interpretation. A federal district court in Arkansas held that a city violated the takings clause under Nollan when it denied a gas station operator permission
to build a convenience store on the site of the gas station unless he granted
the city an expanded right-of-way along the property.127 The court found
that under
Nollan granting the public access to private property is a tak8
ing.

12

The court found that Nollan required a showing by the city that
the development of plaintiff's property would create additional burdens
on the present public right-of-way. 29 Without such a showing, the ci, 's
attachment of the condition to its building permit is 'simple extortion.
The court found that the city had failed to meet its burden under Nollan
and issued an injunction ordering the city to issue the permit without con131
ditions.
These cases demonstrate the confusion in takings law which NolIan makes inevitable. Courts are free to determine for themselves how
much connection between the government's interests and its regulations
in furtherance of its interests is enough. Such discretion in the scrutiny of
government actions has produced widely disparate results when Nollan is
applied to land use regulations.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.

Id. at 699.
Associated Builder & Contractors v. Baca, 769 F.Supp. 1537 (N.D. Cal. 1991).
Id. at 1551.
Id. at 1551-52.
Id. at 1552.
Id.

127. W.J. (Jack) Jones Insurance Trust v. City of Fort Smith, Arkansas, 731 F.Supp. 912 (W.D.
Ark. 1990).
128. Id.at913.
129. Id. at 914.
130. Id.
131. Id.
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PROHIBITING OUTDOOR SIGNS
In Naegele Outdoor Advertising Inc. v. City of Durham,132 a billboard
company challenged an ordinance enacted by the city of Durham, North
Carolina, which prohibited all commercial, off-premise advertising signs,
except along highways. The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit found
that the Nollan Court had invalidated the easement requirement because it
did not serve a governmental purpose related to the building permit.133 In
advertiscontrast, the court found that the prohibition of certain billboard
134
ing was directly related to the city's interest in aesthetics.
The court did not require the city to present any evidence or findings to support this assertion. Nor did it consider whether owners of commercial signs could be singled out to bear the burden of the city's interest
in aesthetics. It simply stated, without explanation, that the case could be
on the grounds that it raised 'significantly difdistinguished from Nollan
135
ferent takings issues.'
Once again, the slippery nature of the Nollan analysis is apparent.
In this case, the court was able to discern a sufficient relationship between
the city's interest in aesthetics and the prohibition on billboards, without
any evidence on this point from the city. Further, the Court distinguished
the issues in Naegele from the issues presented in Nollan. Because the NolIan Court found that no nexus existed in that case, courts can distinguish
their cases from Nollan if they find any nexus at all. Several have chosen to
do exactly that.
PROTECTING MOBILE HOME DWELLERS
Azul Pacifico,Inc. v. City of Los Angeles 136 highlights the confusion
in current takings law. There, mobile home park owners challenged various provisions of the city of Los Angeles' rent control ordinances, which
they claimed transferred a property interest from owners to tenants in
their mobile home park. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals defined the
through physical
issue as whether the ordinance operated as a taking137
occupation of the mobile home park owners' property.
The court stated the takings test for claims based on mobile home
rent controls as: 1) Does the governmental action constitute a taking?; 2)
Does the action advance a legitimate governmental interest?; and 3) Has

132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.

844 F.2d 172 (4th Cir. 1988).
Id. at 178.
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Id. at 177.
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Id. at 579-80.
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just compensation been paid?13 8 The court addressed each question in
turn.
First, the court found that the ordinances transferred to the tenants the right to occupy pads in the park indefinitely, while paying belowmarket rent. 139 Further, the court found that this property interest was
transferable, had market value, and was actually traded on the market by
tenants.140 For these reasons, the court found that the ordinances effected
a taking of Azul Pacifico's property under the Loretto physical occupation
rule.141In its analysis of the second question, the court asserted that NolIan required a "close analysis of the means of protecting the asserted governmental interest." The court first found that the city's aim was to protect
tenants from excessive rent increases and hardships from displacement.
But the court said that the ordinances did not protect incoming tenants,
because the ordinances did not keep down the costs for incoming tenants.
Instead, new tenants just paid the increase to the vacating tenant as part of
purchasing their trailer, rather than in increased rent to the park
the cost of
14 2
owner.
However, the court found that the ordinances did protect incumbent tenants from landlords who might set rents for new tenants so high
that no one would buy an existing tenant's trailer.143 The court held that
protecting incumbent tenants was a legitimate government purpose.
court upheld the ordinances and addressed the issue of
Therefore, the 144
compensation.
The court found that the city's action was a permanent physical
occupation of the park owners' property. Therefore the city must compensate Azul Pacifico. 145 It cited Nollan for the proposition that if the city
wished to "create a windfall for current coach owners," 146 it must spread
the burden on all its citizens, rather than targeting the small class of
mobile home park owners to foot the bill. 147
This case demonstrates the confusion surrounding application of
the Nollan standard. In contrast to the Nollan Court, the Ninth Circuit
looked for a legitimate government purpose which the Act might fulfill.
Finding such a purpose, the court declared the Act valid. Nonetheless, it
still required the state to pay compensation based on the permanent phys138. Id. at 579.
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ical occupation principle. What is clear is that the smorgasbord approach
to takings analysis remains the norm, and takings litigants still face essentially ad hoc decisions by courts.
CONCLUSION
Lower courts have not significantly altered the standard under
which they review land use regulations in the wake of Nollan. Some courts
have noted that Nollan seems to require heightened scrutiny. But few
appear to have actually applied any higher standard of review to government land use decisions.
The decision in Nollan provides a tool for conservative courts
wishing to enhance the protection of private property rights against government regulation. The requirement of an 'essential nexus' between the
government's stated purpose and its means of achieving that purpose
allows courts to more closely scrutinize government land use regulations.
Where a court finds the means inadequately suited to the end, it can find
a regulation invalid, as did the Nollan Court, or require compensation. The
threat of courts second-guessing public policy decisions affecting property could undermine innovative land use planning efforts.
It appears that takings analysis remains essentially an ad hoc factual inquiry. Courts have great discretion in how they apply the Supreme
Court's many takings tests, and Nollan does not seem to have altered that
basic feature of takings law. The varying applications of the Nollan test
itself demonstrates that takings analysis still produces unpredictable
results. However, Nollan has offered courts another tool with which they
may find that government action has gone too far and effected a taking.
Nollan invites courts to peek behind the land use decisions of the
elected branches to see if they are supported by a legitimate public purpose and to see whether land use enactments really accomplish their
stated goals. The Nollan Court displayed a deep skepticism toward the
motives of legislators, at least where their actions affect property rights.
However, to date, very few courts have adopted the intrusive approach to
land use regulation which critics of Nollan feared.
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